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MANUFACTURERS' STRICT LIABILITY FOR INJURIES
FROM A WELL-MADE HANDGUN
Litigation ostensibly resolves conflicts regarding the individual
rights and duties of the parties before the court.1 Judicial deci-
sions, however, often affect more than an individual legal contest.
The final decision in a case may establish precedent for future liti-
gants in analogous situations.2 In some cases, the outcome contrib-
utes to a public policy dialogue on a particular issue3 or triggers
major changes related to that policy issue.4 For example, displayed
prominently near the mouth of many champagne bottles is a bold-
print warning that advises the consumer to point the plastic cork
stopper away from people when opening the bottle. Government
regulators have not mandated the warning. Apparently, some vint-
ners decided to stamp the warnings on their products soon after a
1. The New York Court of Appeals in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257
N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), aptly stated the judicial role:
A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of parties
before it. Its decision of private controversies may sometimes greatly affect
public issues. Large questions of law are often resolved by the manner in which
private litigation is decided. But this is normally an incident to the court's
main function to settle controversy. It is a rare exercise of judicial power to use
a decision in private litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct
public objectives greatly beyond the rights and interests before the court.
Id. at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (4th ed. 1971).
3. Perhaps more than any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a battleground of
social theory. Its primary purpose is to make a fair adjustment of the parties' conflicting
claims. The twentieth century, however, has brought an increasing realization of the involve-
ment of general societal interests in privately litigated disputes. Id. at 14-15.
4. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). There, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that defendant automaker had a
duty to design its car to protect occupants against unreasonable injury during a foreseeable
accident. The decision in Larsen affected substantially the "intended use" doctrine, which
provided that an automaker had no duty to plan for the consequences of an accident, be-
cause an automobile was not intended by the manufacturer to be in an accident. The Larsen
"crashworthiness" doctrine became the majority rule, giving automakers an economic incen-
tive to produce 'safer cars.
See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (insulating news media from
libel recoveries for false statements if made in good faith) (policy issues of constitutional
freedom of the press).
5. Telephone interview with Betsy Bradford, Acting Chief, Commodity Classification
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consumer, blinded by a flying cork, sued a champagne producer.'
The appearance of champagne cork warnings," although not a ma-
jor change in itself, illustrates how plaintiffs using the courts for
personal redress can stimulate widespread changes in the
marketplace.
Similar to the appearance of champagne cork warnings, gun con-
trol advocates, dismayed at the failure of legislatures to enact laws
to stem handgun violence,8 hope to use the judicial forum to effect
policy changes.9 These advocates are studying closely litigation 0 in
which plaintiffs seek to hold firearms manufacturers strictly liable
for injuries resulting from handgun incidents. Handgun plaintiffs
allege strict liability even when the weapons involved are "well-
made" handguns that function perfectly and exhibit no hidden
defects."
Branch, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Dep't of Treasury (Nov. 23, 1982).
6. Shuput v. Heublein, Inc., 511 F.2d 1104 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying Utah law). The
plaintiff asserted, under a strict liability theory, that a champagne bottle without a warning
was defective and unreasonably dangerous. The champagne producer contended, as a matter
of law, that everybody knows confined carbonation can transform a bottle stopper into a
harmful projectile. The trial court directed a verdict for the producer, but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a jury should decide whether
the lack of a warning rendered the bottle unreasonably dangerous. Id.
7. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
8. Ninety percent of all gun-related injuries in America in 1980 involved handguns. These
incidents resulted in over 22,000 deaths. Newsweek Magazine, Aug. 2, 1982, at 42.
9. Podgers, Tort Lawyers Take Aim at Handguns, 11 THE BRIEF, A.B.A. TORT & INS.
PRAc. SEC. 5 (1981).
Plaintiffs pleading novel handgun claims in tort may encounter courts convinced that leg-
islatures, not courts, should make policy determinations concerning firearms. See, e.g., Aber-
nathy v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1, 5, aff'd, 556 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1976)
(dismissing claim that whiskey distiller's failure to warn of inherent dangers of alcohol ren-
dered whiskey defective) (legislature, not the court, is proper body to require warning la-
bels); Knecht v. St. Mary's Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 78, 140 A.2d 30, 32 (1958) (in refusing to
abrogate tort immunity of charitable organization, court said issue "poses a question of pub-
lic policy whicli falls peculiarly within the competence of the legislature"). But see Casrell v.
Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128, 133 (Ala. 1976) ("By extending the doctrine of manu-
facturer's liability, we are not invading the province of the Legislature. Developing case law
is the proper role of this court, and that is what we are doing in this case.").
10. Applebome, The Gun Fighter, TEX. MONTHLY 76, 79 (Feb. 1982); Podgers, Handguns
New Target for Tort Lawyers, 67 A.B.A. J. 1443 (1981).
11. This Note will not address claims involving malfunctioning weapons. Many plaintiffs
have won recoveries against manufacturers for injuries caused by firearms that failed to
function as the manufacturer intended. See, e.g., Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d
151 (La. App. 1979), aff'd on rehearing, 395 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 1981) (plaintiff's thumb
injured by weapon with malfunctioning safety). In product liability law, such flaws are la-
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Most courts, applying traditional product liability law, would
dismiss a strict liability claim against manufacturers of well-made
firearms. 12 Recent developments in a minority of jurisdictions,
however, may assist handgun plaintiffs. Most notably, the 1978
California Supreme Court case of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.13
rejected traditional product liability doctrines that limit strict lia-
bility recovery to situations in which products fail to meet the
safety expectations of the ordinary consumer. In addition to a
novel legal theory of risk-utility balancing, these developments
give plaintiffs the tactical advantage of shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant manufacturers. Under this approach, hand-
gun plaintiffs may force firearms manufacturers to prove to a jury
that a handgun's benefits outweigh its risks of danger.
Extension of strict liability to manufacturers of well-made hand-
guns would accomplish several goals. Most important from the per-
spective of the plaintiffs, the new theory would provide a previ-
ously untapped source of damage recovery. 14 From the perspective
beled manufacturing defects. See W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABMITY, §§ 151-155
(1979 & Supp. 1981).
12. See infra notes 58-77 and accompanying text. Most jurisdictions would dismiss the
handgun claim at the pleading stage.
13. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
14. The "deep pocket" of a firearms corporation supplies the only practical recovery
source when a person shoots a member of his family. For example, a wounded sister who
successfully sues her brother wins nothing if the parties share a common source of financial
support. In incidents other than intra-family shootings, other sources of recovery may exist.
Full redress, however, would depend on the personal wealth of the defendant or the exis-
tence -nd extent of applicable liability insurance.
Dean Prosser commented on the tendency of courts to shift the burden of loss to defen-
dants with greater economic resources:
Another factor to which courts have given weight in balancing the interests
before them is the relative ability of the respective parties to bear the loss
which must necessarily fall upon one or the other. This is not so much a matter
of their respective wealth, although certainly juries, and sometimes judges, are
not indisposed to favor the poor against the rich. Rather, it is a matter of their
capacity to absorb the loss or avoid it. The defendants in tort cases are to a
large extent public utilities, industrial corporations, commercial enterprises,
automobile owners, and others who by means of rates, prices, taxes, or insur-
ance are best able to distribute to the public at large the risks and losses which
are inevitable in a complex civilization. Rather than leave the loss on the
shoulders of the individual plaintiff, who may be ruined by it, the courts have
tended to find reasons to shift it to the defendants. Probably no small part of
the general extension of tort law to permit more frequent recovery in recent
years has been due to this attitude.
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of public policy, forcing the gun manufacturer to pay15 for the
damages caused by its product will provide an economic incentive
to make the product safer. 6 Whether the plaintiffs win or lose, gun
control advocates have an ulterior goal. They hope that the cost of
litigation and any resulting increased insurance costs will force
firearms manufacturers to increase handgun prices. Ideally, in-
creased prices will deter sales and help stem the proliferation of
handguns, thus reducing handgun injuries and deaths."'
The success of handgun plaintiffs in pleading this new theory
could trigger changes that some might consider undesirable. For
example, if additional safety features were required, the firing effi-
ciency of weapons would be reduced, 8 thus compromising the
safety of a person using the weapon for personal protection. Less
serious would be the inconvenience these safety features would im-
W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 4, at 22 (footnotes omitted).
15. Handgun plaintiffs currently are focusing their attack on manufacturers rather than
gun dealers. One treatise lists public policies supporting such tactics:
(1) The manufacturer was in a peculiarly strategic position to promote safety
in his products; (2) The manufacturer was often in the dominant economic
position in the chain of production and distribution; (3) Imposing liability on
the manufacturer corresponded to the growing practice for makers to indem-
nify or insure dealers who handled their products; (4) The manufacturer could
anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the
public could not; (5) The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health could
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business.
W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 11, § 2, at 11.
But see Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977)
(limiting liability to the immediate supplier for negligence per se in violating a gun control
statute).
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 4, at 23.
17. Applebome, supra note 10, at 80. A handgun plaintiff's best chance for victory exists
when the litigation involves a weapon with minimal utility. An inexpensive, inaccurate,
small-caliber weapon that is virtually useless for hunting or target shooting possesses little
utility for purposes other than use against human beings at close range. Id. See also Darts
and Laurels, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 22 (citing investigative series in
Cox Newspapers, Sept. 6-11, 1981) (giving statistical evidence of disproportionate criminal
use of short-range, inaccurate handguns labeled as "snubbies" because of their short bar-
rels). If strict liability recovery is limited initially to such inexpensive handguns, the result-
ing price escalation will affect only those weapons. The price differential, therefore, will
narrow between the inexpensive snubbies and larger handguns. Eventually, the cheap hand-
gun will cease to exist, and consumers who wish to purchase snubbies will have to pay al-
most as much as they would for a more substantial firearm.
18. See infra note 194.
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pose on hunters or target shooters. Additionally, handgun price es-
calation, whether caused by litigation, increased insurance costs, or
radical design modification, would make future handgun ownership
a function of personal wealth.
The pending litigation over firearms manufacturers' strict liabil-
ity has attracted national attention.19 This Note will examine the
novel risk-utility balancing approach developed by some courts in
design defect strict product liability actions. In examining this the-
ory, the Note explains the unavailability of negligent entrustment
theories and the obstacles attending traditional strict liability doc-
trines for handgun plaintiffs. Finally, the Note evaluates the risk-
utility balancing approach in the firearms context and concludes
that despite some obstacles, handgun plaintiffs may prevail against
handgun manufacturers in limited circumstances.
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
Inadequacy of the Negligent Entrustment Theory
Recent commentary suggests that a negligence theory can assist
plaintiffs in handgun litigation.20 Alluding to section 390 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts,21 one commentator asserts that plain-
tiffs can establish negligence by showing that a firearms manufac-
turer failed to prevent distribution of the weapons to "obviously
irresponsible" persons, such as those with criminal intent.2 Al-
though current law rejects this theory, an analysis of the unavaila-
bility of the negligent entrustment theory will aid in understanding
the handgun plaintiff's situation.
Section 390 and related sections23 of the Restatement describe a
19. E.g., Newsweek Magazine, supra note 8.
20. Podgers, supra note 9, at 5; Speiser, Disarming the Handgun Problem by Directly
Suing Arms Makers, 11 NAT'L L.J. 29, 30 (1981).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of
his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreason-
able risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should
expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm resulting to them.
22. Speiser, supra note 20, at 29.
23. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965):
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cause of action known as negligent entrustment. 4 Under this the-
ory, a plaintiff alleges that he was injured because the defendant
supplied an object to a third person with actual or constructive
knowledge that the person might use the object in a manner in-
volving an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the plaintiff or
others. For example, plaintiffs injured by individuals who have
misused alcoholic beverages have prevailed on the negligent en-
trustment theory.25 Additionally, plaintiffs have used the negligent
entrustment theory to allege that defendants negligently sold26 or
loaned 27 firearms or weapon-like toys to incompetent persons.
As in all negligence actions, the defendant's conduct is the vital
element of the cause of action.28 In firearms entrustment actions
plaintiffs allege improper conduct, not in the design or manufac-
ture of the device, but in its distribution. In determining a defen-
dant's culpability, courts invariably demand a showing that the de-
fendant possessed actual or constructive knowledge that the
person acquiring the device could not be trusted with it.2 9 Under
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an
activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should
know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct him-
self in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm
to others.
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 104, at 678-79.
25. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959);
Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 445 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 593 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1979) (rifle sold to felon); Bojorquez v. House of Toys,
Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1976) (slingshot sold to minor); Moning v.
Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977) (slingshot sold to minor).
27. See,e.g., Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1965); Pepper v. Hof-
fecker, 56 Del. 162, 192 A.2d 213 (1963).
28. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 30, at 143.
29. Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1965) (15-year-old boy shot
hunting companion; adult who gave gun to boy and dealer who sold gun to adult with
knowledge of boy's subsequent use were not negligent because neither knew of boy's care-
lessness); Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 445 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 593 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1979) (defendant lacked actual knowledge of gun pur-
chaser's criminal record; no recovery on entrustment theory); Semeniuk v. Chentis, 1 Ill.
App. 2d 508, 117 N.E.2d 883 (1954) (complaint stated cause of action where seller had ac-
tual knowledge that adult was buying air rifle for 7-year-old who lacked appreciation of
danger); Sabatinelli v. Butler, 363 Mass. 565, 296 N.E.2d 190 (1973) (father who permitted
20-year-old son to have gun not negligent when no evidence that father knew or should have
known of son's propensity to misuse weapon; knowledge of son's psychiatric and drinking
[Vol. 24:467472
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section 390 of the Restatement, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant knew or had reason to know of the acquiring party's in-
competence.30 Firearms plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in assert-
ing negligent entrustment because they are unable to bear this
burden.
Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.31 demonstrates the typical
judicial response to a negligent entrustment claim against a fire-
arms supplier. In Hetherton, a gun customer lied to a salesman by
asserting that he was not a felon.32 Under Delaware law, felony sta-
tus precludes a person from purchasing or owning a deadly
weapon. Additionally, Delaware, like many states,3 4 requires fire-
arms vendors to subject prospective purchasers to a rigid identifi-
cation procedure.3 5 The salesman in Hetherton failed to follow the
required procedure.36 The felon bought a rifle and subsequently
problems not sufficient evidence to submit negligence issue to jury); Moning v. Alfono, 400
Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977) (jury question whether defendants, in selling slingshots
directly to children, had knowledge that buyers would use improperly); Corey v. Kaufman &
Chernick, 70 R.I. 27, 36 A.2d 103 (1944) (seller of gun to adult with knowledge that buyer's
15-year-old son would use not negligent when no statement made to seller concerning boy's
experience with weapons).
Courts also have required scienter in the analogous situation of negligent entrustment of
alcoholic beverages. Whether a bartender had knowledge of a customer's intoxication while
continuing to sell him alcoholic drinks is a significant issue in cases of automobile accident
injuries involving intoxicated individuals. See, e.g., Gonzales v. United States, 589 F.2d 465
(9th Cir. 1979); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 7 Mass. App.
813, 390 N.E.2d 1133 (1979); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Campbell
v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977); Simon v. Shirley, 69 Pa. Super. 364, 409 A.2d
1365 (1979).
Similarly, cases alleging negligent entrustment of motor vehicles or other machines re-
quire scienter. See, e.g., Pugmire Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Sorrells, 142 Ga. App. 444, 236
S.E.2d 113 (177) (automobile accident); Vann v. Willie, 38 Md. App. 49, 379 A.2d 411
(1977), aff'd, 284 Md. 182, 395 A.2d 492 (1978) (motorboat accident).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
31. 445 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 593 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1979).
32. 445 F. Supp. at 296 n.1. The buyer declared on a required federal firearms form that
he was not a felon. He later was convicted on a charge of knowingly making a false state-
ment on the required form.
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448 (1974).
34. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-402 to -406
(1981).
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 904 (1974). The statute requires a seller to record the names
of two freeholders who reside in the state in which the purchase is attempted and who can
verify the identity of the prospective purchaser.
36. 445 F. Supp. at 296. The seller merely asked the customer to display a driver's license
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used it to wound the plaintiff.
In his first count, the plaintiff pleaded that the salesman negli-
gently entrusted the rifle to the purchaser by failing to use reason-
able caution in determining whether the purchaser was permitted
statutorily to own a firearm.3 7 In two other counts, the plaintiff
alleged that the salesman's failure to comply with the state identi-
fication procedure 8 and a corresponding federal statute" consti-
tuted negligence per se.4°
The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment on all
three counts. As to the negligent entrustment count, the trial court
concluded that the common law should not be extended to impose
a duty on the firearms dealer to investigate the truthfulness of a
purchaser's statement absent some knowledge or reason to believe
that the purchaser was likely to misuse the firearm.4' Regarding
and complete a federal firearms transaction record.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 35.
39. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2) (1976). The statute forbids a firearms
supplier from selling a weapon unless he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
sale will not violate state law. Id. In Hetherton, the applicable state law prohibited the sale
of deadly weapons to felons. 445 F. Supp. at 296 n.4 (applying DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
1448 (1974)).
40. Dean Prosser discussed negligence per se as follows:
Once the statute is determined to be applicable-which is to say, once it is
interpreted as designed to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is
included, against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred as a
result of its violation-the great majority of the courts hold that an unexcused
violation is conclusive on the issue of negligence, and that the court must so
direct the jury. The standard of conduct is taken over by the court from that
fixed by the legislature .... The effect of such a rule is to stamp the defen-
dant's conduct as negligence, with all the effects of common law negligence,
but with no greater effect. There will still remain open such questions as the
causal relation between the violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and, in the
ordinary case, the defenses of contributory negligence, and assumption of the
risk.
W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 36, at 200.
41. 445 F. Supp. at 305. Testimony revealed that one telephone call to local police would
have exposed the customer's felony record. Id. at 304 n.26. The court reasoned, however,
that the possible sources of information a seller theoretically could check are numerous.
Federal and state laws specify other disabilities that legally preclude firearm ownership in
addition to felon status. These disabilities include drug addiction, illegal alienage, felony
indictment, and a history of mental institution commitments. See Gun Control Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3), (d) (1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448 (1974). The court noted
that the plaintiff had not suggested how many verification checks would constitute reasona-
ble caution. 445 F. Supp. at 305 n.27.
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the other two counts, the trial court conceded that violation of the
two statutes was negligence per se, but held as a matter of law that
the plaintiff had not established sufficient causation between the
statutory violations and the injury.42
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding on the negligent entrust-
ment count,43 but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the
other two counts." Emphasizing that the purpose of the Delaware
and federal statutes was to prevent criminals from obtaining weap-
ons," the court held that whether the statutory violations proxi-
mately caused plaintiff's injuries was a jury question46 and re-
manded the case for such a determination. 7
The court in Hetherton relied on both state and federal gun reg-
ulation statutes to reach its final decision. The Gun Control Act of
196848 established a nationwide standard for suppliers to follow to
prevent gun procurement by felons, fugitives, felony indictees,
drug users, dishonorably discharged veterans, the mentally ill, and
the mentally incompetent. State statutes supplement the federal
effort.4 9 Violations of these statutes by gun sellers can establish a
42. 445 F. Supp. at 298.
43. 593 F.2d at 531.
44. Id. at 532.
45. The trial court accepted the defendant's argument on the purpose of Delaware's "two
freeholder" identification procedure. See supra note 35. The purpose was to verify the iden-
tity of the prospective buyer, not to reveal any felony record. 445 F. Supp. at 298. The Third
Circuit disagreed, holding that the Delaware Legislature imposed the additional identifica-
tion procedure to make the purchase of weapons more difficult for felons. "Compliance with
the statute would have prevented consummation of the sale at least at that time because
[the purchaser] was not accompanied by two freeholders." 593 F.2d at 531.
The Third Circuit quoted the report of a national commission on gun controh "Because
laws regulating firearms possession are not self-executing, many systems back up the prohi-
bition against gun ownership by bad risk groups with procedures to make it physically more
difficult for such persons to obtain firearms." 593 F.2d 526, 531 (quoting FIREARMS AND Vio-
LENCE IN AMRIcAN LIFE, A STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 82 (1969)) [hereinafter cited as FREARMs AND VIOLENCE].
46. 593 F.2d at 531.
47. Id. at 532.
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976).
49. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442 (1982) (requiring handgun purchasers to wait
seven days before consummation of sale while police authorities process application); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-402 to 406 (1981) (sheriff's permit needed to buy firearm; purchaser must be
of good moral character; dealer must keep transaction records); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3
(West 1982) (permit required); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6111 (Purdon 1973) (48-hour
19831
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plaintiff's cause of action, as in Hetherton, under a negligence per
se theory.50 Commentators conclude, however, that the significant
number of handgun injuries demands that courts require a higher
standard of care than that set by the statutes." Using a negligent
entrustment theory, the commentators propose an expansion of
the "reason to know" prong of section 390 of the Restatement,
52
thereby creating an extensive duty to investigate the background
of prospective gun purchasers.
Commentators urge such an expansion of the standard because
the pre-transaction procedures mandated by gun control statutes
do not detect all "obviously irresponsible" persons.53 The proce-
dures formulated to keep felons from purchasing firearms will not
prevent nonfelons from buying guns on behalf of felons. Nor will
the procedures affect gun purchasers with clean records who in-
tend to use the weapons to commit their first crimes. Similarly,
emotionally disturbed individuals without a history of judicial
delay between customer application and completion of transacton). But see VA. CODE § 15.1-
524 (1981). Virginia has a minimal gun control scheme, giving Virginia counties power to
require handgun sellers to record purchaser information after the sale and transmit infor-
mation to the circuit court clerk. Id.
50. See, e.g., Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835
(1977).
51. See, e.g., Speiser, supra note 20, at 29. The same courts that refuse to apply a higher
standard of care also acknowledge the probable need for such a higher standard in many
situations. See 593 F.2d at 532.
52. See supra note 21.
53. One commentator uses this phrase to describe the type of person that gun sellers
should detect under an expanded duty to investigate. See Speiser, supra note 20, at 29.
Additionally, Speiser has suggested that handgun manufacturers could devise computerized
systems to supplement statutory identity verifications of prospective gun buyers. Such a
computerized system could be similar to the system used by many supermarket chains that
have collaborated with food producers to devise a system of label codes that facilitates shop-
per transactions and inventory. See id.
Another commentator cited Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977), in
proposing that gun manufacturers be liable for failure to implement distribution controls.
See Podgers, supra note 9, at 7. In Moning, the court held that a jury should decide whether
a slingshot manufacturer had created an unreasonable risk of harm in marketing its prod-
ucts directly to children. 400 Mich. at 434, 254 N.W.2d at 763. The decision in Moning,
however, is not precedent for an expansion of a supplier's duty to investigate. Because the
slingshot purchasers were children, the supplier had actual knowledge of the buyers' incom-
petence. When a 10-year-old boy attempts to buy a dangerous toy, the supplier need not
investigate to determine whether the customer is youthful. The situation is not analogous to
the sale of firearms to adults, because adults generally display no outward signs that they
are unfit to own weapons.
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commitment can purchase firearms despite statutes precluding the
mentally ill from gun ownership." Thus, the statutory schemes fail
to achieve their purpose of preventing those whom the law has
termed incompetent from obtaining firearms.
Congress and the state legislatures, by enacting gun control stat-
utes, have provided courts with a convenient standard of care.
Rather than articulate a proper and more realistic standard, the
courts use the statutory standards to circumscribe a gun supplier's
duty to investigate. If a gun supplier complies with the applicable
regulations prior to selling a weapon, and such compliance does not
result in a discovery that the gun customer is precluded statutorily
from purchasing a gun, courts usually conclude that the supplier's
investigation was sufficient and precludes liability. Upon compli-
ance with the statute, the supplier has done enough; he has no
"reason to know" 55 that the customer is unfit to own a firearm.
Despite recognition by both courts and commentators that the
statutory standard of care is inadequate, courts are unwilling to
alter this approach. Whether out of deference to the legislature or
because of convenience and simplicity in application, courts con-
tinue to emphasize compliance only with state and federal gun
control laws. 56 Thus, gun control advocates should abandon efforts
54. Although states maintain records of judicial commitments, privacy statutes could
limit disclosure of those records. Additionally, the records do not include names of persons
who commit themselves voluntarily. Finally, many persons without histories of commit-
ments nevertheless suffer severe emotional illness.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
56. Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977)
(sale to felon in violation of gun control statute is negligence per se); Tamiami Gun Shop v.
Klein, 109 So. 2d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), afj'd, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959) (minor sold rifle
in violation of statute could recover despite contributory negligence); Zamora v. J. Korber &
Co., 59 N.M. 33, 278 P.2d 569 (1954) (dealer's negligence per se in selling rifle to minor
contrary to statute sufficient to overcome directed verdict motion based on minor's contrib-
utory negligence); Willigan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 A.D.2d 1033, 308 N.Y.S.2d 74
(1970), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 680, 269 N.E.2d 399, 320 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1971) (no recovery for negli-
gent entrustment of firearm to minor in absence of statute); Neff Lumber Co. v. First Natl
Bank, 122 Ohio St. 302, 171 N.E. 327 (1930) (minor's criminal use of shotgun did not super-
sede liability of dealer who sold weapon in violation of statute); Hulsebosch v. Ramsey, 435
S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (absence of statute forbidding rifle sale to minor results in
summary judgment for defendant dealer); Pizzo v. Wiemann, 149 Wis. 235, 134 N.W. 899
(1912) (sale of toy pistol to minor in violation of statute creates cause of action).
A Florida jury recently awarded an injured police officer $1 million on a statutory viola-
tion claim. A gun supplier sold a rifle to a person under felony indictment, which is a disa-
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to use a negligent entrustment theory against handgun manufac-
turers because establishing liability under such a theory requires
the plaintiff to prove that a supplier had actual or constructive
knowledge of the buyer's incompetence. 7 Because a gun cus-
tomer's appearance may not betray his motives, background, or
competence with weaponry, a gun supplier usually has no actual
knowledge of the customer's irresponsibility. Under the construc-
tive knowledge prong of negligent entrustment, statutory and prac-
tical considerations limit a supplier's duty to investigate. Consider-
ing the unlikelihood of holding a seller or supplier liable for
negligent entrustment, the chances of reaching a manufacturer,
who is further removed from the transaction, are even more re-
mote. Therefore, alleging manufacturer negligence in the distribu-
tion of handguns provides no realistic possibility of recovery for
injuries from well-made guns. The handgun plaintiffs should con-
centrate instead on the deficiencies of the product design.
Traditional Strict Liability and the Consumer Expectation Test
Plaintiffs in recent products liability actions increasingly bypass
negligence theories and plead strict liability. Unlike negligence,
which concentrates on the reasonableness of a supplier's conduct,
strict liability stresses the condition of the product itself. 8 Strict
liability theories give plaintiffs tremendous tactical advantages and
allow them greater chances for victory.59
bility to gun ownership under federal law. See supra note 41. The supplier's employee vio-
lated the federal statute aimed at identifying the disability. The purchaser loaned the rifle
to his brother, who shot the plaintiff. Keller v. K-Mart Enterprises of Florida, Inc., No. 79-
17539 (Fla. Cir. Ct. August 12, 1981).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
58. See Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
The cause of action covered by the term "strict liability in tort" is designed to
relieve the plaintiff from proving that the manufacturer was negligent in some
particular fashion during the manufacturing process and to permit proof of the
defective condition of the product as the principal basis of liability.
Id. at 677.
59. See W. KmeLs & R. LEsHE, supra note 11, § 77.
In product liability, proof is the Achilles' Heel of the negligence action. With
its range of possible plaintiffs unlimited by doctrines of privity, the negligence
action would provide all the remedy that considerations of public policy re-
quire, were it not for the need for and difficulty of proving the manufacturer's
or seller's negligence. To prove a product defective is one thing; to prove that
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Strict liability gained credence in 1963 with the California Su-
preme Court's decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. 0 The plaintiff in Greenman was injured by a piece of wood
ejected from a lathe. At issue were whether the manufacturer neg-
ligently constructed the lathe and whether the manufacturer vio-
lated an express warranty in marketing a product that did not per-
form as advertised. Writing for the court, Justice Traynor held
that the plaintiff need not conform his claim to traditional theories
of negligence or warranty: a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort if
its product causes injury.6
Contemporaneous with the Greenman decision, the American
Law Institute (ALI) debated a proposed section to the Restate-
ment of Torts addressing the strict liability concept.6 2 The ALI is-
sued the final draft of Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A"3 two years after Greenman. Section 402A and Greenman
revolutionized product liability law by conditioning liability, not
on the supplier's degree of reasonable care, but on the actual con-
the defect flowed from a failure to exercise reasonable care is quite another.
The one does not "prove" the other; even the most careful manufacturer may
produce a defective product. The injured plaintiff, therefore, is faced with the
requirement that he prove both a standard of care in an industry or business of
which he may know nothing, and the departure from that standard which may
be equally mysterious.
Id.
60. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
61. "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
62. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 98.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
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dition of the product.6 4 A plaintiff no longer had to prove that a
supplier negligently produced a product. Under strict liability the-
ory, the mere deficiency of a product proved the plaintiff's case.
Although similar, Greenman and section 402A do not describe
an identical cause of action. Greenman suggests unconditional
manufacturer's liability upon proof of a product-related injury.
Section 402A, however, requires proof that the product when pur-
chased was "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous."6 5
Courts have used the Restatement's definitions of "defective con-
dition""e and "unreasonably dangerous"6  to temper the revolu-
tionary aspects of the strict liability concept. Commentators 6 and
courts have agonized over the two definitions because of their in-
ternal inconsistencies.6e Most authorities agree that the definitions
outline a liability-limiting device known as the consumer expecta-
tion test.70 The consumer expectation test may be summarized as
follows: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the commu-
nity as to its characteristics. 7 1
64. See R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILTY LAW, chs. 4, 6 (1980).
65. See supra note 63.
66. "The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it
leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, com-
ment g (1965) (emphasis added).
67. "The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of the
product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." Id., comment i.
68. See, e.g., J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LABIrrY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS RE-
QuIEMENT, ch. 4 (1981).
69. See supra notes 66 & 67. The Restatement defines each term with reference to the
other. Professor Wade labeled the definitions a tautology. Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 831 (1973).
70. See, J. BEASLEY, supra note 68, chs. 4, 7.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1979).
Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, con-
taining a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good to-
bacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking
may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be un-
reasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely be-
cause, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to
heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unrea-
sonably dangerous.
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Seventeen years after the adoption of section 402A, plaintiffs
seeking compensation for injuries inflicted by well-made handguns
are attempting to establish causes of action 2 in strict liability for
defective design.7 These plaintiffs will be unsuccessful in most
courts because a majority of jurisdictions follow some variation of
section 402A and the consumer expectation test.7 4 Thus, in most
jurisdictions, a well-made handgun cannot form the basis for a
strict liability claim because the weapon does not contain dangers
uncontemplated by the ordinary consumer.7 5 The inherent dangers
of a handgun are common knowledge; therefore, a handgun that is
flawlessly manufactured and contains no hidden design defects
passes the consumer expectation test and cannot be considered
"unreasonably dangerous. '76  In an analogous context, tobacco
manufacturers have used the consumer expectation test to escape
Id.
Some courts have interpreted the references to whiskey, tobacco, and butter in comment i
of § 402A to mean that the entire comment deals solely with household substances that
usually present a risk only from excessive consumption. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Machine
Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 464 n.2, 432 N.E.2d 814, 817 n.2 (1982). This argument supports the
view that the "unreasonably dangerous" component of § 402A has no independent signifi-
cance in determining whether strict liability should apply in a product case. See infra notes
86-94 and accompanying text. According to the prevailing view, however, comment i em-
braces all products. See J. BAasLEY, supra note 68, at 72-76.
72. Typical plaintiffs include: the survivors of a child who shot himself while playing un-
attended with a handgun; an adolescent boy paralyzed by a fellow student's handgun that
discharged in a school parking lot; and persons or the survivors of persons shot intentionally
by criminals. See Wolf v. Colt Indus., No. 81-11899-6 (Dallas County, Tex., 134th D.) (set
for trial June 20, 1983) (survivors of a child); Clancy v. Zale Corp., No. 81-11097-D (Dallas
County, Tex., 95th D.) (set for trial Apr. 9, 1983) (a boy paralyzed); Patterson v. Rohn
Gesellschaft, No. CA3-81-1006-R (N.D. Tex. filed Sept. 1981) (survivors of criminal shooting
victim). See also Applebome, supra note 10, at 79-80; Newsweek Magazine, Aug. 2, 1982, at
42.
73. Strict liability for product defect embraces both manufacturing defects and design
defects. See W. KImBLE & R. LSHER, supra note 11, chs. 8, 9. When a product does not
perform to the manufacturer's specifications and results in injury, the plaintiff alleges a
manufacturing defect. Id. Handgun plaintiffs currently seek compensation for products that
function as designed; therefore, these plaintiffs must prove that the design itself is
inadequate.
74. Most jurisdictions follow § 402A's formulation of "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous." Id. § 2 n.41.
75. Comment i to the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), provides in perti-
nent part: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." Id. at 352.
76. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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liability for cancers resulting from their products' use because the
community in general is aware of the dangers of cigarette smok-
ing.7 Similarly, firearms manufacturers should escape liability be-
cause of the common perception that handguns are dangerous.
In the minority of jurisdictions that reject the consumer expecta-
tion test, handgun plaintiffs have a viable chance for success. In
those jurisdictions, general community perceptions concerning
handguns will not necessarily dispose of the liability question as
they would under the majority consumer expectation test. Hand-
gun plaintiffs have a better chance for recovery in jurisdictions
adopting the risk-utility balancing approach pioneered by the Cali-
fornia courts.
THE NEW APPROACH: JURY BALANCING OF PRODUCT DESIGN'S RISK
AND UTILITY
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.
Much of the recent effort to affect handgun policy issues in the
judicial forum"8 stems from the California Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.79 The court in Barker uti-
lized a risk-utility balancing test for determining product defec-
tiveness.80 Using an unprecedented approach, the court held that
once the plaintiff established a prima facie case of causation, the
burden of proof shifted to the defendant to show that the design's
utility outweighs its risk."1
In Barker, the plaintiff, Ray Barker, was operating a loader to
move lumber to the second floor of a building under construction.
After parking the loader on a steep slope below the building and
77. Government regulation has insulated tobacco manufacturers from strict liability even
further by requiring them to post health warnings on cigarette packages. Section 402A's
comment j states that, to prevent a product from being unreasonably dangerous, a seller
may be required to give consumers an adequate warning. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 402A, comment j (1965). Cigarettes, therefore, are insulated even from the comment j
exception. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 64, ch. 8; Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Anal-
ysis and A Survey of its Validity, 29 MERCER L. REV. 583 (1978).
78. See Fisher, Are Handgun Manufacturers Strictly Liable in Tort?, CAL. ST. B.J., Jan.
1981, at 16.
79. 20 Cal. 34 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
80. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. For examples of California lower
court decisions that previously had used the risk-utility balancing test, see infra note 96.
81. Id. at 432-33, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
[Vol. 24:467
STRICT LIABILITY OF HANDGUN MANUFACTURERS
beginning to lift the lumber, Barker felt the load shift. He leaped
from the machine, and a piece of lumber fell from the machine and
seriously injured him.8 2
Barker sued the machine's manufacturer on a strict liability the-
ory. He contended that one or more design defects caused the acci-
dent.13 The manufacturer claimed that the machine was not defec-
tive and that Barker's inexperience in operating the machine was
the proximate cause of the accident.s After the trial court in-
structed the jury that it would have to find the machine "unrea-
sonably dangerous" for Barker to recover, the jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the manufacturer.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held the trial court's
jury instruction erroneous.8 5 Citing California precedent, 8  the
court stressed its past "disagreement with the restrictive implica-
tions of the Restatement formulation"8' 7 of the consumer expecta-
tion test s on which the trial court based its instruction. The court
noted that the Restatement definition of "unreasonably danger-
ous"8 9 shields a defendant from liability so long as a product does
not fall below the ordinary consumer's expectations as to the prod-
uct's safety.90 Recalling the rationale of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp.,91 the court concluded that adherence to a consumer expec-
tation test as a ceiling on manufacturer's liability would prevent
82. Id. at 419, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
83. Id. at 420-21, 573 P.2d at 447-48, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30.
84. Id. at 422, 573 P.2d at 449, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
85. Id. at 426, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
86. Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1974); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972); Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
87. 20 Cal. 3d at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965).
89. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
90. 20 Cal. 3d at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233. The court stated that under
California law, ordinary consumer expectations establish a floor on manufacturers' responsi-
bility, whereas the Restatement treats expectations as a ceiling. Id. at n.7. Consumers under
California law can assume that the products they buy will be at least as safe as they expect.
Under the Restatement approach, a manufacturer producing a product no safer than what
the ordinary consumer expected will not be liable.
91. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). In Cronin, the court stated
that the Restatement's imposition of a dual burden of showing defectiveness and unreasona-
ble danger does not apply in actions alleging strict liability for design. Id.
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"another Greenman" ' 2 from recovering in a strict liability case.93
The lower court's rationale would subvert the decision in Green-
man by enabling a manufacturer of relatively dangerous products
to shield itself from liability by showing that an ordinary consumer
would have contemplated the risk of danger from the product at
issue.94 Thus, under Barker, the consumer expectation test is use-
ful only in determining that a product is so defective that it does
not meet even ordinary expectations.9 5
The more controversial aspect of Barker addresses products that
arguably are not defective. Regarding marginally defective prod-
ucts, the California Supreme Court ratified the use of a risk-utility
balancing test by lower courts in determining a product's defec-
tiveness.96 The risk-utility test embodies Professor John Wade's
contention9 7 that the expectations of the ordinary consumer cannot
92. The court used the plaintiff in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), as a prototypical strict liability plaintiff.
93. 20 Cal. 3d at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
94. For example, a lathe, the product at issue in Greenman, generally is considered a
dangerous product. Although the decision in Greenman, which antedated § 402A by two
years, influenced the drafters of § 402A, the section's final version contained the liability-
limiting device of comment i. See Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Action-
ability, 33 VAND. L. Rlv. 551 (1980). This device requires a plaintiff to show not only that
the product at issue was defective, but also that it was unreasonably dangerous. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
In Cronin, the California Supreme Court declared that Greenman still was good law.
[To require an injured plaintiff to prove not only that the product contained a
defect but also that such a defect made the product unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer would place a considerably greater burden upon him than
that articulated in Greenman .... We are not persuaded to the contrary by
the formulation of section 402A which inserts the factor of an "unreasonably
dangerous" condition into the equation of products liability.
8 Cal. 3d at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
95. The consumer expectation test does not aid the defendant in the context of Barker,
because California precedents establish that, at a minimum, a product must meet ordinary
consumer expectations of safety. See supra note 90.
The court in Barker noted that a consumer expectation test is somewhat analogous to the
Uniform Commercial Code's warranties of fitness and merchantability. The test reflects the
warranty heritage upon which California product liability doctrine partially rests. 20 Cal. 3d
at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
96. 20 Cal. 3d at 429-31, 573 P.2d at 454-56, 143 Cal. App. at 236-38 (citing Buccery v.
General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976); Self v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974); Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d
769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973)).
97. Wade, supra note 69, at 829.
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serve as the exclusive yardstick for measuring design defective-
ness.98 Although cautioning that no single definition of defective
design can encompass every conceivable situation,9 the court
presented a definition applicable to the facts in Barker:
[I]n design defect cases, a court may properly instruct a jury
that a product is defective in design if (1) the plaintiff proves
that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary con-
sumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner, or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's
design proximately caused injury and the defendant fails to
prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the bene-
fits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inher-
ent in such design.100
Reviewing previous California decisions, 10 1 the court outlined
some "relevant factors" 10 2 that the jury could consider in assessing
whether the product's design utility outweighs its risk of danger.
These factors included "the gravity of the danger posed by the
challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the
mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial
cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the
product and consumer that would result from an alternative
design . ' '1103
The court's use of the risk-utility balancing test in Barker was
not, in itself, a dramatic development, because lower courts in Cal-
ifornia already had formulated a risk-utility test in similar litiga-
tion.10 4 The innovation in Barker was shifting the burden of proof
98. 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
99. Id. at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454-55, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
100. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
101. Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976);
Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974);
Heap v. General Motors Corp., 66 Cal. App. 3d 824, 136 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Buccery v.
General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976); Baker v. Chrysler
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1970).
102. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 96 & 101.
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to the defendant under the test.10 5 The court noted that "a manu-
facturer who seeks to escape liability for an injury proximately
caused by its product's design. . . should bear the burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that its product should not be judged
defective."10
Once the plaintiff establishes that the product design proxi-
mately caused the injury of which he complains, the burden shifts
to the defendant manufacturer who must convince the jury that
the benefits of his product's design outweigh the design's risk of
danger. If the jury decides that the risk outweighs the benefits, the
design is defective and the manufacturer is strictly liable for all
physical injuries caused by the design.10 7
Barker and its Legacy of Confusion
Courts in other jurisdictions rapidly have recognized the innova-
tive combination in Barker of a risk-utility test and a defendant
burden of proof under that test. 08 Alaska, 109 Ohio, 110 and Flor-
ida"' have adopted the Barker approach either expressly or im-
105. The court in Barker explicitly stated that its central holding involved burden of
proof. 20 Cal. 2d at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. See R. EPSTEIN, supra
note 64, at 82; Wade, supra note 94, at 573.
106. 20 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The court noted that one
of the principal purposes for the use of strict liability in products liability actions is to
relieve plaintiffs of the evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action. Id. See
supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
107. The court in Barker stated that "a product may be found defective in design, even if
it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that
the product's design embodies 'excessive preventable danger.'" 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d
at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (emphasis added). One commentator, incensed at the Barker
decision, noted that the hindsight evaluation of a product design "further turns the screw
against product manufacturers." R. EPsTEmN, supra note 64, at 82 (footnote omitted). "The
Barker decision makes virtually any product-related injury the proper subject for a lawsuit,
in a stunning reversal of the historical presumption that tort recovery is the exception
rather than the rule." Id. The controversy spawned by Barker underlies the enthusiasm
shown recently by plaintiffs claiming that well-made handguns are defective. The risk-util-
ity jury balance outlined in Barker and similar holdings in other jurisdictions promise
chances for success on claims previously thought to be unrecoverable.
108. For a criticism of Barker, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 64, at 82.
109. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884 (Alaska 1979).
110. Knitz v. Minister Machine Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 466, 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1982).
111. Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1145 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See Au-
burn Machine Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979).
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plicitly. Courts in Colorado,"' West Virginia,1" 3 Washington,"1 4
and Kansas,11 5 however, have rejected the approach in Barker.
Some states, without mentioning Barker, follow some aspects of
the case. New York"" and Texas,17 for example, use variations of
the risk-utility test but retain the requirement that a plaintiff
prove a product unreasonably dangerous before it can be found de-
fective, s a requirement that California rejected.'19 Other states,
such as Pennsylvania,2 0 imitate Barker's rejection of the unrea-
112. Union Supply Co. v Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 171 n.5, 583 P.2d 276, 282 n.5 (1978).
113. Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 684 (W.Va. 1979).
114. Connor v. Skagit Corp., 30 Wash. App. 725, 732, 638 P.2d 115, 120 (1982).
115. Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 653, 641 P.2d 353, 361 (1982).
116. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403
N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980). The court of appeals described a defective product as
"one which, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, is in a condition not reasonably contem-
plated by the ultimate consumer and is unreasonably dangerous; one whose utility does not
outweigh the danger inherent in its introduction into the stream of commerce." Id. at 479,
403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720 (emphasis added).
117. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). The court in Turner
followed an approach between the Restatement formulation and a risk-utility balancing test.
The court defined a defective product as one that is "unreasonably dangerous as designed,
taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use." Id. at
847 n.1. In putting the "unreasonably dangerous" determination to the jury, the trial judge
should neither define the concept according to the comment i consumer expectation test,
nor explicitly outline the various risk-utility factors to the jury. Such factors, the -court
noted, involve a balancing that is implicit in the determination of unreasonable danger. Id.
at 851.
The approach in Turner probably is closer to the Wade-Keeton negligence equivalency
test than to the approach in Barker. In the Wade-Keeton test, constructive knowledge of a
design defect is imparted to a manufacturer who arguably may not have been aware of the
defect when he placed the product on the market. Given this constructive knowledge, a jury
then decides whether the manufacturer was prudent in marketing the product. The court
uses various risk-utility factors in deciding whether the plaintiff has established a case suffi-
cient to reach the jury. Unlike the approach in Barker, the judge does not instruct the jury
explicitly concerning the relevant risk-utility factors. See Keeton, Manufacturers' Liability:
The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRAcusE L. REV.
559 (1969); Wade, supra note 69, at 837-38; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,
19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
118. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
119. See generally J. BEASLEY, supra note 68 (dividing American jurisdictions into four
categories based on their approaches to the "unreasonably dangerous" standard: those fol-
lowing the Restatement, those following Greenman/Cronin, those following the Wade-Kee-
ton approach, and those with no specific approach).
120. "It must be understood that the words 'unreasonably dangerous' have no indepen-
dent significance and merely represent a label to be used where it is determined that the
risk of loss should be placed upon the supplier." Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa.
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sonably dangerous requirement but have not yet adopted a risk-
utility test. Courts in some states have erroneously interpreted
Barker as presenting an alternative definition of "unreasonably
dangerous" rather than rejecting that concept and its concomitant
consumer expectation test.121
Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co.
A California intermediate court case, Garcia v. Joseph Vince
Co.,"22 illustrates the confusion created by Barker; moreover, Gar-
cia has special relevance to the handgun plaintiffs because the liti-
gation involved a novel claim analogous to those involving well-
made handguns. Analyzing the court's misapplication of the new
risk-utility approach in Garcia illuminates the difficulties that
handgun plaintiffs may face if a court follows the Barker approach.
The plaintiff in Garcia suffered an eye injury during a fencing
match when his fencing opponent, wielding an illegally sharp
blade, pierced the plaintiff's wire mesh face mask. The plaintiff
sued the mask manufacturer, alleging that the mask design proxi-
mately caused the injury. The trial court dismissed the action, and
the plaintiff appealed.12 3
The intermediate court affirmed the dismissal, misreading
Barker in three ways. First, the court stated that before a jury may
be instructed to employ the risk-utility balancing test, the plaintiff
must establish the existence of a product defect. 24 The court in
Barker, however, actually held that a plaintiff's burden lies in es-
tablishing causation between the product's design and the injury;
once the plaintiff establishes causation, the jury decides whether
547, 556, 391 A.2d 1020, 1025 (1978).
"[T]he 'reasonable man' standard in any form has no place in a strict liability case ....
The plaintiff still must prove that there was a defect in the product and that the defect
caused his injury; but if he sustains this burden, he will have proved that as to him the
product was unreasonably dangerous." Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 96,
337 A.2d 893, 900 (1975) (plurality).
121. Palmer v. Avco Distributing Corp., 82 Ill. 2d 211, 219, 412 N.E.2d 959, 963 (1980);
Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 220-21 (Iowa 1980); Nichols v. Union Underwear
Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Ky. 1980) (Lukowsky, J., concurring).
122. 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, .48 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978).
123. Id. at 871, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
124. Id. at 874, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
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the design is defective. 125 The jury, not the judge, decides the issue
of defectiveness, guided by the various risk-utility factors outlined
by the court in Barker.121 Second, the court in Garcia erred in re-
quiring the plaintiff to show that he used the product in its in-
tended manner,127 because the suggested jury instruction in Barker
cited "intended use" as only one factor under the consumer expec-
tation prong. 128 Finally, the court in Garcia mistakenly read
Barker as requiring the plaintiff to prove the reasonableness of al-
ternative designs.129 Read properly, the court in Barker held that
the jury should consider alternative design as one of several rele-
vant factors in the risk-utility test.130 Thus, a plaintiff need not
demonstrate the existence of alternative designs to get the case to
the jury, but the defendant bears the burden of proving the unrea-
sonableness of design alternatives.
The plaintiff in Garcia should have been permitted to present
his case to the jury because the risk-utility approach merely re-
quires that the plaintiff establish causation between the product
design and the injury.3 1 Arguably, the plaintiff in Garcia could
have established the necessary causation by alleging that the
mask's defective design caused the blade to pierce the mask and
cause the injury. Proximate cause having been established, the
burden of proof would shift to the manufacturer, to show that the
design was not defective. Even if the plaintiff's case in Garcia had
gone to the jury, the defendant probably would have prevailed.1 3 2
125. 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
126. Id.
127. 84 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
128. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
129. 84 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
130. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
131. Id.
132. The defendant manufacturer in Garcia easily might have overcome the burden of
showing that the mask design was not defective. First, the manufacturer could have intro-
duced evidence that no other manufacturer marketed a significantly different mask. See
generally J. BEASLEY, supra note 68, ch. 14 (discussion of "state of the art" as a factor in
design defect litigation). If the plaintiff had hypothesized a design featuring impenetrability,
such as one using unbreakable plastic, the defendant could have produced experts to testify
that wire mesh is lighter, cheaper, and more breathable than a hypothetical plastic mask.
Finally, statistical evidence of the improbability of the accident that occurred would have
supported the argument that the risk of injury was slight. See supra note 103 and accompa-
nying text.
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The court's misapplication of the Barker approach, therefore, did
not prejudice the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the trial court's concep-
tual errors in applying the Barker test should not have been per-
petuated by the appellate court. The appellate court should have
affirmed by explaining that, under a proper application of Barker,
the defendant still would have prevailed.
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court in Garcia ad-
dressed the paramount question that remains after Barker: at what
point does a plaintiff establish proximate cause and shift the bur-
den of proof to the manufacturer under the risk-utility test? When
a defendant presents an overwhelming case, as in Garcia, the an-
swer is virtually irrelevant to the outcome. In closer cases, however,
the answer could be decisive. Forcing a manufacturer to prove that
its design's utility outweighs its risk of danger gives the plaintiff a
significant tactical advantage, especially when the jury performs
the balancing.133
The California Supreme Court and other courts following
Barker3 4 have not delineated fully the requirements under the
new approach's causation prerequisite. Presently, the common law
of strict liability for design defect gives trial judges wide latitude in
using causation considerations to terminate litigation at an early
stage. By noting that a plaintiff must meet causation require-
ments, 3 5 the Barker holding suggests that a judge can use those
requirements to dismiss claims or give directed verdicts in cases
involving novel liability theories.13 6 Absent any guidance as to a
judge's proper exercise of such discretion, causation looms as the
most formidable obstacle for handgun plaintiffs applying the
Barker approach.
APPLICATION OF THE Barker APPROACH: THE HANDGUN PLAINTIFF'S
CAUSATION OBSTACLE
For a cause of action to be complete, any tort plaintiff must
133. The combination of an injured plaintiff and a sympathetic jury could result in vic-
tory even if the design objectively passed a risk-utility test.
134. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
135. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
136. The court in Barker acknowledged that its decision would not make manufacturers
insurers of their products. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
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show a substantial connection between the defendant's act or
omission and the plaintiff's injury.13 7 Causation is as important to
strict liability actions as it is to negligence actions.138 Showing that
a defendant's act or omission was a cause of the harm is insuffi-
cient. To establish liability, the plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant's act or omission was the proximate cause of the injury. 3 9
This proximate cause requirement also must be satisfied under the
Barker approach. In handgun litigation, plaintiff's proximate cause
obstacles are twofold. First, he must show a causative link between
an alleged design defect and the injury. Second, the handgun
plaintiff must overcome any allegation of superseding cause. Only
if plaintiff overcomes these obstacles will the jury then balance risk
and utility.
Demonstrating a Causative Link Between Design and Injury
To prevail under the Barker theory of strict product liability,
the plaintiff must make "a prima facie showing that the injury was
proximately caused by the product's design. 1 40 This requires that
the plaintiff show that some aspect of the handgun design caused
his injury, even though the weapon was manufactured flawlessly
and contained no hidden dangers. The handgun's physical charac-
teristics could supply the required design-injury nexus. Unlike
rifles, handguns are concealable and maneuverable, characteristics
that a court could interpret as causative factors in any shooting
incident.141
Assuming the handgun's physical characteristics create a height-
ened injury potential, plaintiffs could strengthen the causative link
by arguing that the lack of additional safety features increased
that potential. Although alternative design feasibility is one of the
137. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41, at 236.
138. J. BEASLEY, supra note 68, at 411.
139. Id. at 413. The Restatement defines proximate cause as a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965).
140. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. For the text of a suggested
jury instruction, see supra text accompanying note 100.
141. Criminals can conceal handguns more easily than rifles. Similarly, legitimate hand-
gun users can store handguns in household locations accessible to curious children. Addi-
tionally, the light weight and compact dimensions of handguns enhance their maneuverabil-
ity and increase the likelihood that users will point the handguns in unsafe directions during
handling.
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"relevant factors"'14 2 that juries must weigh in the risk-utility bal-
ance, a plaintiff also can use alternative design to demonstrate
proximate cause. First, the plaintiff could use statistics of frequent
injuries by handgun discharges 143 to demonstrate the foreseeability
of such an occurrence.1 44 Next the plaintiff could argue that certain
hypothetical safety features would have prevented these inci-
dents. 45 Finally, the plaintiff could assert that because the injuries
were foreseeable and preventable by use of additional safety fea-
tures, the lack of such features proximately caused the injuries.""
The design-injury nexus required under the Barker theory de-
parts from the traditional causation requirements of strict liability.
The majority view as defined by section 402A, looks initially to the
ordinary consumer's expectations to determine defectiveness. 4 7
Under the majority approach, something is "wrong" with the prod-
uct if it contains hidden dangers not in the contemplation of the
ordinary consumer. 14 Once the existence of a defect is established,
whether the defect caused the injury must be determined.
In contrast, under the Barker approach the initial inquiry is
whether the alleged design defect caused the injury. Then, this mi-
nority approach 49 determines whether the design was, in fact, de-
142. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. Initially, in deciding whether the
plaintiff met the causation requirement, the judge determines only whether the lack of the
hypothetical design alternative proximately caused the injury. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at
455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
143. See FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE, supra note 45, ch. 5.
144. See generally J. BEASLEY, supra note 68, ch. 15.
145. For example, if the claim involves a child who found a loaded pistol and shot a
playmate, the plaintiff may argue that a design lacking a "child-proof" safety mechanism,
analogous to bottle caps on prescription drugs, proximately caused the shooting. Similarly, a
plaintiff who shot himself while handling what he thought was an unloaded revolver could
argue that a warning light denoting the presence of a bullet in the firing chamber would
have prevented his injury. Therefore, the lack of such a device proximately caused the
injury.
146. "There is also authority to the effect that a plaintiff is not necessarily barred from
recovery because the danger is open and obvious, as where an injury occurs due to momen-
tary forgetfulness or inattentiveness, if a possible safety device could have eliminated the
danger. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 11, at 167. The fact that additional safety
features are nonexistent should not preclude the plaintiff from establishing proximate cause
under the Barker approach. 20 Cal. 3d at 430 n.10, 573 P.2d at 455 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. at
237 n.10.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comments g, i (1965).
148. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 97, at 659.
149. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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fective. The traditional rule, therefore, searches for a defect-injury
causative link while Barker requires a design-injury link. The dis-
tinction is subtle, but has far-reaching effects in the handgun con-
text. A plaintiff, using innovative theories such as the lack of hypo-
thetical safety devices, conceivably could establish the design-
injury nexus if the allegedly dangerous design causes an injury.
The causative link having been established, if the jury finds the
risks of danger outweigh the utility of the handgun, the design is
defective and the manufacturer is strictly liable for the injuries
caused by that design.
Overcoming the Defense of Superseding Cause
Even if the plaintiff demonstrates the necessary causative link,
establishing proximate cause in a firearms case may be thwarted
by the doctrine of superseding cause. Where the plaintiff's injuries
resulted from the intentional criminal acts of another, the plaintiff
probably will be unable to demonstrate the proximate cause con-
nection. Although a causative link arguably exists, the handgun
manufacturer's claim of superseding cause would prevail in most
jurisdictions. 150
For example, a plaintiff shot by a criminal during a robbery
might attempt to establish that the weapon's concealability, a de-
sign feature, proximately caused the shooting. Perhaps a court
would consider concealability a causative factor; but, given the ten-
dency of courts to find intervening criminality a superseding
cause,151 the plaintiff probably would fail to establish the necessary
design-injury nexus. When a shooting is unintentional, the hand-
gun plaintiff is more likely to convince a court that proximate
cause exists because courts are less willing to declare that non-
criminal activity supersedes an antecedent act or omission of a
defendant. 152
Nevertheless, a common assumption in firearms cases is that the
negligence of the person pulling the trigger is an intervening
150. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R. Co., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146
(1910). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 44.
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force15 3 that supersedes other causative factors.154 For example, in
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Bloyd, 55 the Kentucky Supreme Court
framed the issue of superseding cause in words resembling a slogan
in the gun control debate: "By their very nature firearms are dan-
gerous, but do not kill people. It is the action of people in the use
of firearms that kill or injure people."158 In Bloyd, a carwash em-
ployee discovered a loaded revolver while cleaning a car interior.
The gun, a replica of a Victorian-era weapon including the original
safety mechanism defect, discharged and wounded the employee.
The victim sued the gun manufacturer and the owner of the car
and gun. The jury awarded the victim $50,000 from the gun manu-
facturer and a nominal amount from the owner.157
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's finding of manufacturer liability. 5 8 The court reasoned that
the owner's negligence was a superseding cause of the injury be-
cause the manufacturer had warned gun purchasers about the
safety defect and the manufacturer could not have foreseen that
the owner would show "pure and culpable negligence" in storing a
loaded weapon under a car's floor mat. 59 Thus, the court in Bloyd
followed the majority rule'60 and invoked lack of foreseeability to
declare the gun owner's intervening negligence a superseding cause
of the plaintiff's injury.16 '
A 1977 Arkansas decision, Franco v. Bunyard,62 however, dem-
onstrates that handgun plaintiffs may be able to satisfy the fore-
seeability test and avoid having a claim barred by the superseding
cause doctrine. In Franco, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a
153. "An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing harm to another
after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTs § 441(a) (1965).
154. See, e.g., DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
Dias v. Daisy-Heddon, - Ind. App .... 390 N.E.2d 222, 226 (1979).
155. 586 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1979).
156. Id. at 21.
157. Id. at 20.
158. Id. at 23.
159. Id.
160. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 68, at 414-16.
161. Foreseeability thus remains a factor in determining superseding cause despite a
trend toward abandoning foreseeable consequences as a test for proximate cause generally.
See id.
162. 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977).
494 [Vol. 24:467
STRICT LIABILITY OF HANDGUN MANUFACTURERS
summary judgment for a defendant gun dealer who sold a pistol to
an escaped convict 0 3 who used the weapon to murder two persons.
The trial court held that the convict's criminal use of the weapon
was an unforeseeable intervening force that superseded the seller's
negligence of failing to require adequate identification prior to the
sale. 1 4 The supreme court disagreed, holding that the dealer's neg-
ligence was a proximate cause of the murders because the murders
would have been avoided had the federal regulations been
obeyed.6 5 The court reasoned that the buyer's use of the pistol to
injure others was foreseeable, even though the dealer may not have
foreseen the precise sequence of events leading to the shootings.'
Franco is a vital precedent for persons seeking to affect national
handgun policy through litigation and is indicative of a trend away
from the traditional view of superseding causation.' Each time
courts follow this trend, they weaken the belief that subsequent
intervening criminal forces supersede antecedent defendant acts or
omissions. Notwithstanding such developments, the traditional
view remains strong,' and plaintiffs injured intentionally by
handguns will face great difficulties in circumventing intervening
criminality as a bar to recovery.
Plaintiffs in cases involving accidental discharges of guns may
avoid superseding cause as a bar to recovery by relying on prece-
dents in the analogous area of negligent entrustment of alcoholic
beverages. Traditionally, courts absolved bartenders of negligence
for selling liquor to persons already intoxicated because the buyer's
consumption of the liquor, not the transaction, was the proximate
cause of any accident following the purchase of an alcoholic bever-
age. 69 Courts, however, are increasingly rejecting the traditional
163. Id.
164. Id. at 145, 547 S.W.2d at 92.
165. Id. at 147, 547 S.W.2d at 93. The existence of the gun control statute influenced the
court in finding that the convict's criminal acts were not a superseding cause. Arguably, the
dependence in Franco on negligence per se could limit the use of the case as a precedent in
an intervening force situation.
166. Id.
167. See generally J. BEASLEY, supra note 68, ch. 15.
168. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying Mis-
souri law); Starage v. Bilbo, 382 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (sale of liquor was not
proximate cause of shooting accident, even though "dram shop" law established negligence
1983]
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view. Many courts have held bartenders liable for serving alcohol
to already-intoxicated persons who subsequently become involved
in accidents. 170 In these cases, the customer's negligence in drink-
ing and driving did not supersede the seller's negligent entrust-
ment of liquor. In other decisions, the existence of a dram shop
statute triggered automatic seller liability,17 ' allowing the courts to
ignore the traditional views concerning a drinker's responsibility
for his own actions.172 Similarly, handgun plaintiffs must counter
traditional views that the negligence of the shooter supersedes any
design deficiencies in the weapon.
"Second collision" cases provide another source of precedent
modifying traditional views on superseding causation. In these
cases, plaintiffs injured in accidents sue the automakers, alleging
that the manufacturing or design defects increased the severity of
their injuries.17 3 Traditional tort law precluded plaintiffs from pur-
suing these claims on the rationale that an automobile's involve-
ment in collisions was not its intended purpose. 7 4 Under the tradi-
tional view, the factors immediately causing the accident
superseded the automaker's negligence in marketing the car, the
design of which enhanced occupant injuries in the accident.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit modi-
fied this doctrine in 1968 in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.75 The
plaintiff in Larsen contended that the car's design proximately
caused his impalement on the steering wheel during a frontal colli-
sion. The manufacturer countered that the plaintiff's negligence
proximately caused the accident and all injuries, even those en-
hanced by the automobile's design. The Eighth Circuit rejected the
per se of bartender); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 7 Mass. App. 813, 390 N.E.2d
1133 (1979) (auto accident); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970)
(refusing to abrogate common law presumption that it is not a tort to sell liquor to "able-
bodied men").
170. See supra note 25.
171. See, e.g., Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971);
Taylor v. Ruiz, 394 A.2d 765 (Del. 1978). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 538.
172. The common law presumes that an "able-bodied man" is responsible for his own
actions, even if he becomes increasingly intoxicated by drinks provided by a wantonly negli-
gent bartender. See, e.g., Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970).
173. See generally R. EPSTEIN, supra note 64, at 77; R. HURSH & H. BAIL.Y, AmERIcAN
LAW OF PRODucrs LIABILITY § 9.3 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1981).
174. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
175. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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traditional doctrine espoused by the manufacturer, and held that
the automaker should have known that many of its products even-
tually would be involved in injury-causing mishaps; therefore, the
automaker had a duty to design its products accordingly. 17 Fur-
thermore, the duty of reasonable design existed regardless of the
intervening factors that directly caused the accident. 177
The growing adherence to the Larsen rule1 78 indicates a general
decline in the significance of the intervening forces doctrine when
litigation attempts to assess responsibility for physicaf injuries.
Cases in which plaintiffs recover for enhanced injuries despite the
plaintiffs' blatant intervening negligence clearly illustrate this
trend.
17 1
Relying on these recent precedents that deemphasize intervening
forces in accident cases, plaintiffs injured by accidental handgun
discharges can challenge the traditional presumption that the per-
son pulling the trigger takes sole responsibility for the shooting.
For example, when a child finds a handgun in his parents' bedroom
night table and wounds himself, courts should consider recent
precedents demonstrating a more liberal approach to intervening
forces instead of routinely ruling that the parents' negligence su-
persedes any design defect. 80
Jury Balancing of Risk-Utility Factors
Under the approach pioneered in Barker, once the plaintiff
176. Id. at 502-03.
177. Expressing typical reluctance to make the manufacturer an insurer of its product,
the court noted that the automaker need not design cars to protect occupants in every con-
ceivable accident. Rather, the automaker has a duty to eliminate design components that
pose an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of foreseeable mishap. Id. at 503.
178. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977) (containing compilation
of jurisdictions following Larsen).
179. See, e.g., Palmer v. Avco Distributing Corp., 82 I1. 2d 211, 412 N.E.2d 959 (1980)
(child riding atop intake of manure spreader fell into pulverizer); Fields v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976) (speeding, drunken driver caused accident; driver's
wanton behavior not a product misuse that would supersede design defect).
180. The parents' negligence in this situation consisted of allowing the child access to a
loaded handgun. This negligence, however, occurred subsequent to the manufacturer's act of
marketing a weapon that a child easily could fire. Under the Barker formulation, plaintiffs
representing the injured child could argue that a handgun design lacking a "child-proof"
safety mechanism proximately caused the shooting. See W. IMBLE & R. LESHER, supra
note 11, § 135.
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shows causation, the burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer to
prove that the benefits of the gun's design outweigh any risks of
danger presented by its design. If the manufacturer fails to carry
this burden, the jury should find the design defective and hold the
manufacturer strictly liable for the injuries caused by that
design."' 1
The court in Barker suggested several factors for consideration
by the jury in making its defectiveness determination. 182 Although
this list is not all-inclusive, these factors provide insight into how a
judge might instruct the jury in a claim involving a well-made
handgun.
The first suggested factor, the "gravity of the danger posed by
the challenged design,"r8 3 presents an issue that the manufacturer
will have no choice but to concede. A concealable and highly ma-
neuverable handgun that discharges a projectile at great speed
with the touch of a finger poses the gravest of dangers. The second
factor, that such danger is likely to occur,'84 may be demonstrated
by statistical analysis. Thousands of persons die each year due to
accidental, negligent, or intentional handgun discharges.8 5 The
likelihood that thousands more will die in similar occurrences
therefore is great.
A third factor, involving "the mechanical feasibility of an im-
proved design,"'18 probably would be the most intensely litigated
factor. Because the basic components and structure of pistols and
revolvers vary little within the industry, the firearms manufacturer
will argue that he has met his duty under the industry state of the
art. 87 Courts have split, however, as to the weight accorded to a
"state of the art" defense in products liability litigation. 88 Addi-
181. 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
182. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
183. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
184. Id.
185. See Newsweek Magazine, supra note 8, at 42.
186. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
187. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 68, at 393-410.
188. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976) ("state of the art"
is valid defense in strict liability action). But see Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Co., 487
F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974); Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10
Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295
N.E.2d 110 (1973).
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tionally, courts exhibit a growing tendency to require manufactur-
ers to exceed industry standards if the situation so warrants.189
Under a more demanding standard, a jury may accept the testi-
mony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses that the invention and im-
plementation of added safety devices were feasible. For example,
one such device could require an additional procedure in the firing
process, such as the engaging of a switch simultaneously with the
pulling of the trigger.190 Also included within the list of suggested
balancing factors in Barker is "the financial cost of an improved
design." '91 Research and development of any new safety device,
along with retooling of factory assembly lines and market testing,
would increase the manufacturer's cost; however, the manufactur-
ers probably would pass these costs on to their customers in the
form of higher handgun prices.'92
The final suggested factor that a judge might instruct the jury to
consider is the "adverse consequences to the product ... from an
alternative design."193 The manufacturer undoubtedly would try to
show that new safety devices would compromise the handgun's
utility. For example, the hypothetical double safety arguably would
disorient users, adversely affecting firing efficiency and accuracy.19 4
189. A frequently applied test in determining the defectiveness of a product's design is
whether the manufacturer has complied with the state of the art. Such a focus requires that
the design be viewed in light of economically and technologically feasible advancements at
the time of manufacture. The test is not merely descriptive of what others in the industry
have done, but rather what could have been done. See W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note
11, § 133.
190. Many household power tools are manufactured with such double switches. For other
hypothetical safety features, see supra note 145, infra note 194.
191. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
192. Gun control advocates would welcome handgun price inflation. See supra note 17
and accompanying text.
193. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
194. See FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE, supra note 45, at 165.
Most handgun designs allow a user, once any safety mechanism has been disengaged, to
fire successive rounds as quickly as he can pull the trigger. A hypothetical mechanism that
would force a user to reengage an additional safety switch prior to each successive trigger
pull would disrupt this process. One court recognized that modification of the typical firing
procedure would diminish efficiency and accuracy. In DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., Inc.,
509 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), the court rejected plaintiff's claim that a shotgun manu-
facturer's failure to increase trigger-pull resistance rendered the weapon unreasonably dan-
gerous. The court included in its balancing test the "deleterious effect on the accuracy and
speed of a marksman" resulting from the plaintiff's hypothetical design alternative. Id. at
768.
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The plaintiff could counter that no reason exists for handguns to
exhibit rapid-fire capability, because legitimate users of guns, such
as hunters, rarely use handguns in their activity, and because those
who do use handguns for legitimate purposes, such as target shoot-
ers, usually shoot slowly and deliberately. If the manufacturer ar-
gued that police need rapid-fire handguns, the plaintiff could sug-
gest that the manufacturer should have established a dual
distribution system: traditional weapons for police and military,
and the new, safer variety for the general public.
The application of risk-utility balancing factors to handgun liti-
gation vividly demonstrates the inherent difficulties facing defen-
dants under the Barker approach. 195 Assuming that the plaintiff
surmounts causation obstacles, the manufacturer must defend a
product that has contributed to many thousands of deaths. To
avoid liability, the manufacturer must convince the jury that the
handgun buyer's desire to purchase weapons unencumbered by ad-
ded safety devices outweighs the social misery caused by the weap-
ons. This formidable burden has led at least one commentator to
state that the Barker approach "turns the screw against product
manufacturers.' 9
CONCLUSION
Prior to the 1978 holding in Barker, victims of flawlessly manu-
factured handguns possessed no viable tort remedy. Although
Barker represents a significant change, traditional views of strict
liability stressing general awareness of inherent product dangers
still preclude recovery in the majority of jurisdictions. Similarly,
negligent entrustment theories provide little hope for handgun
plaintiffs.
Courts would not necessarily consider reduced firing efficiency an adverse consequence in
allocating the factors in the jury's risk-utility balance. Marksmen and other hobbyists even-
tually would become accustomed to the additional safety device, which would be only a
minor inconvenience to these regular users. Conversely, a child who discovers a loaded pistol
with the safety device would be confused and less likely to fire the weapon. Similarly, a
double safety would force an inexperienced adult shooter to proceed more deliberately than
with a weapon capable of rapid fire. Reduced firing efficiency, therefore, should reduce the
incidences of unintentional discharges.
195. Manufacturers of cheap, inaccurate handguns would face the most difficulty, pre-
sumably because their products possess the fewest legitimate benefits. See supra note 17.
196. R. EpsTmN, supra note 64, at 82.
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In jurisdictions following the Barker approach, however, plain-
tiffs should prevail if their cases reach the jury. A handgun design
probably will be held defective when a jury weighs the design's
many risks against its marginal benefits. Getting the case to the
jury, however, will pose difficult obstacles for handgun plaintiffs.
Considerations of superseding causation, particularly in cases of in-
tentional shootings, will defeat many claims. And, even if a trial
judge fails to find that intervening criminality or negligence was a
superseding cause of the shooting, the plaintiff must convince the
judge that the handgun design proximately caused his injury.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff could convince a judge that the hand-
gun design was a substantial factor in a shooting. The plaintiff
could overcome this initial causation obstacle by stressing the
unique dangers of the handgun's physical characteristics and the
absence of essential safety features. Having established proximate
cause, the plaintiff then will advance to the jury determination
with an enviable burden of proof advantage over the manufacturer.
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